

MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS IN
VIETNAM
 — A LEGACY REMEMBERED —

by Terry T. Turner



A Regional Forces (RF) platoon receives training on an M60 machine gun from Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) personnel. (Texas Tech University Vietnam Virtual Archive)

“These (Mobile Advisory) teams have been eminently successful. They’ve done a *hell* of a lot for the RF and PF...They *live* with them, *fight* with them, *patrol* with them, *ambush* with them, and so on. *Then* you get communication, *then* you get reaction.”

— General Creighton W. Abrams

(*The Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1970*, edited by Lewis Sorley)

General Creighton W. Abrams, Commanding General, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was speaking at a staff briefing at MACV headquarters in Saigon on 22 January 1969 in response to a query about adding more Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) to the MACV counterinsurgency program. Abrams, like General William C. Westmoreland before him, was in command not only of the military advisors within MACV, but of all the in-country United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), units as well. USARV was

made up of conventional Army units like the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st Infantry Division, and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), among many others. It was in the context of Abrams’s competing responsibilities, MACV advisor units versus USARV units, that the question of more MATs arose: would it be better to have more advisory teams working with the Vietnamese allies or to assign that same number of officers and men to needy USARV units? Abrams’s response was that the MATs had proven themselves

effective in their task of improving the Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) units. The RF and PF, often referred to as “territorial forces,” were essentially militia units responsible for the defense of their home districts or villages and hamlets as opposed to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), which was South Vietnam’s conventional army responsible for the general defense of the country. Because of their wider responsibility, the RF were better paid and equipped than the PF, but neither had the pay and equipment of the ARVN.

U.S. Army military assistance advisors had been assigned to the ARVN in increasing numbers since the late 1950s, and by the mid-1960s they were represented at every major ARVN unit level down to the battalion. Through those same years, the territorial forces had never had advisors assigned to them. The RF and PF were poorly paid and equipped and were often poorly led. That much was known, but MACV’s lack of direct contact with those units had left it with little specific information about RF and PF troop strengths, true condition, or methods of improvement. That situation improved greatly in 1968 when MACV activated a new counterinsurgency strategy that included the formation of MATs to be posted in every province in the country.

At the time of his comments in 1969, General Abrams was making the point that MATs were already living with local militias in their villages, training them, and fighting along side them. As a result, their RF and PF units were experiencing more combat success and communicating better with both ARVN and U.S. Army units. Consequently, those regular armies were getting better information on enemy activity and achieving better reaction times to it. In Abrams’s view, the MATs had been “eminently successful” and were a significant contributor to the Army’s struggle in Vietnam.

MATs remained important to the combat effectiveness of their RF and PF units, thus to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency program, throughout the period of the American drawdown in Vietnam (1969-1972). Still, most territorial forces units never had advisors and their overall performance remained highly variable, often with serious deficiencies. Further, local militias, no matter how well they performed, could not overcome the deficiencies of an inept national government and the eventual defeat of its conventional forces by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in 1975, two years after the last U.S. Army units had left the country.

Since the end of the American military experience in Vietnam, the presence there of many specific USARV units have been noted and their performance closely studied. In contrast, the presence of MATs and their role in a major U.S. Army counterinsurgency effort has received little attention. This is perhaps due to MATs having operated with relative independence and often in isolated posts. It may be due to MATs not having been part of a conventional USARV unit, thus separating them from conventional histories, or it may be because U.S. advisory efforts, in general, lost cachet in the final withdrawal from Vietnam. Whatever the case, counterinsurgency operations have once again gained profile in American foreign policy and, necessarily, in U.S. Army doctrine. Given that development, the history of the U.S. Army’s Mobile Advisory Teams in Vietnam, both in their conception and results, deserves renewed attention.

Mobile Advisory Teams were a key feature of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), a counterinsurgency effort that had been initiated within MACV in late 1967 under then MACV commander, General Westmoreland. Counter-



Staff Sergeant Tom McLaughlin of MAT IV-44 is shown here on patrol with Popular Forces (PF) personnel in Kien An District, Kien Giang Province, in 1968. (Robert Blair)

insurgency operations—the popular term at the time was pacification—were those aimed at increasing village security while at the same time promoting rural development and the improvement of living conditions in the villages. CORDS was the brainchild of Robert W. Komer, who developed the program in 1966 while a member of the National Security Council and a Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Previous counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam had failed for a variety of reasons. Among them were the long history of political turmoil within the South Vietnamese government and the endemic weaknesses in that government which included corruption, cronyism, and a mandarin administration. On the American side, there had been a divided leadership between the civilian and military pacification efforts, a division that had led to a lack of coordination in those efforts and sometimes to conflicting goals. With these types of problems afflicting all sides, the earlier counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam had had little effect in the countryside.

Komer wanted to change that. He suggested to President Johnson that a new effort be initiated based on the American military, especially the U.S. Army, becoming more involved in the pacification program. He also wanted the U.S. to make greater manpower and resource commitments to pacification, overall, and to have a unified command structure for the effort—civilian and military programs combined in one system headed by one person.

Komer addressed three key points with his CORDS program, each of which he considered important to a successful counterinsurgency effort: security—village populations have to feel safe from the predations of local guerrillas; development—village life has to be enhanced by civic actions that win the people’s loyalty (programs to improve commerce, health, education, or agriculture); and aggression towards the enemy—destroy the insurgents’ infrastructure in the village and counter his claims for legitimacy. Dealing with all three issues at the same time would require coordination between military, constabulary, and intelligence operations, as well as pursuing civic actions advertised by a vigorous public information (some would say propaganda) campaign.

President Johnson and General Westmoreland accepted Komer’s program and agreed to a combined military-civilian counterinsurgency effort with a unified command. Westmoreland

insisted on military control given what would be the large military commitment. In May 1967, Komer was appointed MACV deputy for CORDS (DEPCORDS) serving as a civilian on Westmoreland's general staff. His staff position was equivalent to General Abrams's at the time, who was Westmoreland's deputy for USARV. As DEPCORDS, Komer had authority over both military and civilian sides of CORDS and reported directly to Westmoreland. This relationship of CORDS to the MACV commander remained the same when Abrams became the MACV commanding general in June 1968.

The unified civilian-military structure for CORDS was carried down to the province level by the advisory teams already existing in all forty-four provinces of South Vietnam. These Province Teams were headed by a Province Senior Advisor (PSA), typically a U.S. Army colonel, whose counterpart was the Vietnamese Province Chief, usually an ARVN colonel. The Province Team's Deputy PSA was typically a civilian from the U.S. Agency for International Development or Department of State, and the team itself was composed of both military and civilian staff, each side managing their areas of expertise. Education, agriculture, public health, and other aspects of civil affairs were the responsibility of the Province Team's civilian advisors while security, including the RF and PF, were the responsibility of the military. Intelligence and counterintelligence were a responsibility of the military in cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). All these programs were coordinated under the CORDS umbrella and were represented at the district level by much smaller District Teams and their Vietnamese counterparts.

The District Teams were usually all U.S. Army, though civilian members were sometimes included. The teams were originally to consist of five to eight advisors headed by a major as District Senior Advisor (DSA). In reality, the DSA was often of lower rank and the District Teams were often significantly smaller than originally conceived. The District Teams advised and assisted the Vietnamese District Chief and district-level staff in carrying out development programs and security operations as directed from province headquarters. District Teams also gathered information on the status and activities of the RF and PF units in their district and

on the economic and security status of each hamlet in their district. This information, compiled by the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), was fed into large CORDS and CIA databases used to evaluate the overall counterinsurgency effort.

At the bottom of the CORDS organization, typically serving under the District Teams, were the Mobile Advisory Teams. The MATs lived out in the villages and hamlets of Vietnam and were the basic military operating units of the entire CORDS system. By early 1968, 354 MATs had been authorized to advise and assist the Vietnamese territorial forces across all four military regions of the country (I Corps in the north, II Corps along the central coast and highlands, III Corps around and north of Saigon, and IV Corps in the Mekong Delta). Team designations were by the number of their corps area followed by the specific team number, e.g. MAT IV-37. These small teams operated with relative independence and were often out of sight of everyone save for their villagers and the enemy around them.

In the discussion that follows, the terms usually, commonly, or typically will often appear. This caution is necessary because MATs varied considerably not only in their location and provision, but in the security environment in which they operated, the types and ethnicity of units they advised (RF or PF, Hoa-Hao or Cao Dai, Vietnamese or Montagnard, etc.), and their experiences on the ground. What follows is an attempt to describe a broad average that will relate to most teams in-country, wherever and whomever they served.

MATs consisted of two officers, three enlisted men, and a Vietnamese interpreter. The Team Leader and Assistant Team Leader were authorized to be a captain and a first lieutenant, respectively, though in practice, team leaders were commonly first lieutenants. Both of the team's officers were to be from a combat arms branch (Infantry, Armor, or Artillery). The enlisted men were originally to be sergeants first class or master sergeants and were to serve as the team's light weapons specialist, heavy weapons specialist, and medic. In reality, as with their officers, the MATs' NCOs were often



Robert W. Komer, who developed and led the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in South Vietnam, meets with President Lyndon B. Johnson at the White House, 16 November 1967. (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum)



LEFT: MAT-III-9 is shown in its compound in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province, in 1970. The members of this MAT are (left to right) First Lieutenant Richard Knight (Team Leader), Staff Sergeant Rutledge (first name unknown, Heavy Weapons Specialist), the team's interpreter (name unknown), Staff Sergeant Thomas Gibbons (Light Weapons Specialist), and First Lieutenant Richard Berls (Assistant Team Leader). (Richard Berls)

RIGHT: Staff Sergeant Jim Manship, MAT IV-44 Heavy Weapons Advisor, gives instruction on a 4.2-inch mortar to his RF company in 1968. (Robert Blair)



of a less senior rank than authorized.

The first levy of soldiers to establish the MATs was made in early 1968 (some USARV units had previously set up small teams to advise the militias within their areas of operation; those teams were technically different from the MACV MATs but met many of the same challenges). That first levy was applied to officers and enlisted men already serving in USARV units but who had at least six months remaining on their tour of duty. Before assignment to their teams, the selected officers and NCOs were sent to a two-week advisor school at Di An in II Corps. While the school helped prepare the new advisors for their roles and stayed in operation throughout the Army's advisory effort, it was acknowledged that the limited amount of training there was inadequate to the need. Subsequently, after early 1969, many of the officers and some of the NCOs assigned to MACVCORDS completed the six-week military advisor course at the Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The course focused on weapons and explosives training, counterinsurgency techniques, intelligence and counterintelligence operations, field-expedient engineering, the CORDS program, and Vietnamese language and culture. Some future advisors additionally completed either an eight-week or twelve-week Vietnamese language course run by the Defense Language Institute.

In addition to recognizing that MAT advisors needed more training than was possible at the Di An school, MACVCORDS recognized that MAT advisors needed to be in their role for the entire twelve months of their tour. Thus, beginning in 1969, most MAT personnel arrived in-country assigned to MACV rather than to a USARV unit. Assignments to specific MATs occurred only after the new advisors had reported to their designated Province Teams.

Once established with their RF or PF units, MATs instructed them on such topics as individual and crew-served weapons, small unit tactics, and field first aid. The teams also accompanied their

units in the field, advising and teaching on the spot to improve daylight operations, night ambushes, intelligence operations, and other aspects of district, village, or hamlet security. MATs also gave weapons instruction to local Popular Self-Defense Force units, an even more rudimentary hamlet guard force. The patrolling and ambush techniques employed were often unique to the terrain and people involved, which called for flexibility and ingenuity on the part of advisors and an ability to give credit to the experience of their counterparts within their native environment.

The original concept of a MAT was that it would work with a unit for six to nine months, then move on to another unit—thus, the “Mobile” in Mobile Advisory Team. In practice, many advisors performed their entire tour with a MAT that never moved, likely because of the importance of the unit or the needs of the immediate area where they were working.

While MAT advisors did not command the unit they were advising, the RF and PF commanders were instructed to follow their advisors' directions. Recognizing that reality and wanting to improve recruiting for advisor positions, MACV began crediting MAT officers with combat command time while recognizing that RF and PF leaders had to be taught to be commanders themselves, and not to expect the Americans to always do the job for them.

As a practical matter, assignment of a MAT team to an RF or PF unit was also an assignment to the village or hamlet in which that unit lived. The advisors lived in that village and worked with its officials. In some areas, like the delta of IV Corps, they might be the only Americans for miles around. Depending on where they were posted, MATs' living conditions varied considerably. Their quarters ranged from bunkered brick-and-mortar structures to one-room, wooden team houses designed for easy assembly and disassembly. Most often, the team's base was a village's or hamlet's earthen-walled or otherwise bunkered fort, which also housed the

headquarters of the local RF or PF unit. The forts were typically triangular in design and, as was told to First Lieutenant Richard Berls (Team Leader of MAT III-9 in Ben Hoa Province in 1970) by his RF company's first sergeant, "the three sides of the triangle should be equal to whatever the enemy throws at you!"

The MATs trained their militia units and fought beside them, but they often supported other aspects of the CORDS program. A MAT advisor might assist a local village official in developing a school, a clinic, or some other help for improved life in the villages. Former First Lieutenant Daniel Reimer, Team Leader of MAT II-26 in Tuyen Duc Province in 1971, has said he often thought of his MAT assignment as like being in the Peace Corps with guns. This was not an uncommon sentiment.

One part of the CORDS strategy was to become very aggressive in rooting out the enemy's clandestine operatives in the countryside. Those operatives, the so-called Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), were the targets of the Phoenix program, a joint effort by the military and the CIA. Working with Vietnamese district intelligence officials and the province-level Province Recon Units (Vietnamese units with American Phoenix advisors), MATs aided the Phoenix program when called upon to further weaken the threat of the enemy in their villages.

MATs had to deal every day with the multiple responsibilities of training, combat operations, civil affairs, intelligence operations, and a miscellany of other concerns that defy categorization. Each responsibility made a demand on time, attention, and energy, causing former Lieutenant Reimer to comment about serving on a MAT: "When you think you are ready (to face all the challenges), redouble your efforts. This is a VARSITY assignment!" This push-and-pull between competing duties was parodied by then First Lieutenant Terry Turner, Team Leader of MAT IV-32, Kien Phong Province, in a photograph taken with him standing in front of a PF barrack being constructed from local materials as he holds a weapon in one hand and wears a stethoscope on his chest (see page 41). The thatch construction was meant to represent his team's work in field-expedient engineering, the weapon to represent their combat operations, and the stethoscope to represent their civic action support. The bottle of whiskey in his cargo pocket was a tongue-in-cheek comment on what MAT advisors often felt was needed after a day of dealing with their job's demands.

Despite the CORDS efforts to have its civilian and military personnel working in concert, the two sides did not always mesh well. Each side sometimes felt stymied or undercut by the other, and because of MAT leaders' varied level of advisor training, some arrived on the job never thinking of their teams as being associated with CORDS in any meaningful way. The MATs' relationship with the civilian side of rural development and civic affairs could be good or bad. In the case of former First Lieutenant George Gandeneberger, Team Leader of MAT IV-29 in Go Cong Province in 1969, he concluded, "U.S. civilians in a foreign combat zone are not to be trusted." Anecdotal evidence suggests that some level of ambivalence between the two sides was common; thus, especially in the face of negative experiences, MATs tended to focus on security issues only and left development programs to U.S. civilians.

There is no question that MATs were the poor cousins of the American military in Vietnam. The concept from MACV originally was that MAT members would arrive in country and be issued a personal weapon, a basic load of ammunition, jungle fatigues, boots,

a backpack, and other basic equipment for individual soldiers. After that, the advisor was to be supplied from the Vietnamese logistics system. This was supposed to ensure that advisors paid attention to the supply and sustenance of their territorial forces units, which was supposed to help eliminate corruption in the Vietnamese supply system. The reality was that MAT advisors and their units were at the bottom of the supply chain for territorial forces and were in a poor position to have any significant influence on the corruption happening above them. As a result, MATs were usually forced to become proficient scroungers from whatever USARV or U.S. Air Force, Marine, or Navy units they could reach. As an example, former Captain Bob Blair, Team Leader of MAT IV-44 in Kien Van Province in 1971, said, "Most of the materials for our construction projects came through the (Vietnamese) side, but they were liberally supplemented by MAT NCO-scrounged stuff from the U.S. Seabees...A VC flag or an AK was a potent trading tool." This is an experience widely recognized among MATs.

Sandbags and ammunition that could be difficult to obtain through RF or PF sources were often giveaways at the American units. Ammunition for the RF and PF crew-served weapons (mortars, heavy machine guns) and accessory items for the MATs, like generators, field ovens, or pierced steel planking could be obtained in exchange for captured VC flags or weapons. A pallet of tin roofing might be obtained in exchange for an old M3 submachine gun or an AK-47. The possibilities were endless, and self-authorized supply expeditions directed at reachable American units could be as important to a MAT's survival as its combat operations directed at the enemy.

MATs were often in remote locations difficult to reach by any route but air. This meant that food, laundry, or any other billeting services had to be obtained locally and often had to be paid for from the team members' own pockets. A "country store" of American-style canned goods, flour, sugar, frozen meats, and condiments was maintained in most Province Team compounds. MATs could purchase supplies from the store, but since the supplies varied over time, the remote MATs rarely knew what was available. That, in effect, limited their real access to those supplies. Under those conditions, MAT members learned to eat on the local economy using the local foods and adopting the local table manners and customs. If one could not learn to enjoy *nuoc mam* (a pungent fish sauce), eat rice with chopsticks, pick apart a fish steamed whole in a banana leaf, or munch on cooked rat as if it were barbecued chicken, he likely ended up being shipped to the rear because of malnutrition, culture shock, or an intractable attitude problem.

General Abrams made it clear in 1969 that MATs were doing the job expected of them. Through the remainder of the MACV advisory experience, MAT effectiveness was reported by others to have been demonstrated multiple times by the improved performance shown by the territorial forces units they were advising. Interestingly, former MAT advisors commonly reported seeing a positive difference in their units' performance during the time they were with them, but they often observed that their units' improvements in the field were largely because MATs brought with them increased access to both tactical air and artillery fire support. Those improvements were understandably important to a unit's confidence in the field and its willingness to fight.

In the end, what was the true effectiveness of MATs in the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam? The eventual success of North

Vietnam's conventional army, the NVA, against South Vietnam's conventional army, the ARVN, may seem to make that question irrelevant, but it does not. MATs' success or failure, especially in improving the fighting ability of the RF and PF, remains important because it was an inseparable part of the overall counterinsurgency effort. No aspect of that effort operated in a vacuum, and any analysis of the whole must consider the success or failure of the parts.

MATs were in the villages primarily to advise and assist the local militia units, but as already said, they also assisted with civil affairs projects and intelligence operations. Thus, MATs had connections to each important part (security, civil affairs, intelligence) of the overall counterinsurgency strategy, and their effectiveness must be judged in the context of that strategy to push the enemy from the countryside. While that judgment is made difficult by the ARVN's eventual collapse before the NVA, some analysis remains possible.

First, it should be acknowledged that counterinsurgency statistics (data like the number of hamlets in a province judged to be secure, the number of government officials assassinated, the number of insurgents killed or captured, the progress of various development programs, etc.) can be manipulated and are often complex in their meaning. Still, the data available relevant to CORDS over

its time of operation (1969-1972) indicates that the program made significant in-roads against the communist insurgency. This is a conclusion corroborated by a number of U.S. and North Vietnamese sources that have emphasized the reach and impact of the CORDS program, including both the anti-VCI successes of the Phoenix program and the MAT advisory effort in the villages. In fact, some experts believe it was the success of the counterinsurgency program in the countryside that forced North Vietnam to launch its major conventional-force offensive in 1972. What the Communists could not gain by a popular uprising, they would take by main force.


The ultimate victory of North Vietnam in 1975 can be seen as having trumped any success MATs, Phoenix, or any other aspects of CORDS had in the counterinsurgency effort that had ended in 1972 as a part of the American drawdown. The North Vietnamese victory has led historian Richard Hunt to conclude in his book, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*, that CORDS's overall achievement was ambiguous, at best. That ambiguity is, no doubt, a lasting characteristic of the American effort in Vietnam, but what should not be lost in that ambiguity is the history of the U.S. Army's Mobile Advisory Teams and the lessons to be learned from that history. A list of lessons learned from



Medics from MAT III-26 and MAT III-74 Can Duoc District, Long An Province, teach a field first-aid class to a PF platoon in 1970. (Darrell Goss)




First Lieutenant Richard Torovsky, Assistant Team Leader of MAT I-11, takes part in a patrol conducted by his team's RF unit in Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, in 1969. (Richard Stanley)



Captain Robert Blair (left) and Staff Sergeant Dee Dalton (center) of MAT IV-44 sit in a village café with a Vietnamese bodyguard as they wait for a meeting with the chief of Dong Thai village, Kien Giang Province, in 1971. (Robert Blair)


the MAT experience can be long, but a short set that resonates in the war environment of today is:

1. Advisors should be culturally aware, independent thinkers and easy users of the field-expedient solution. Much of what they will encounter will have no “school solution”; thus, advisor training should contain significant instruction on military adaptability and field-expedient ingenuity. In the task of advising, cultural and language difficulties can blunt an advisors relationship with his counterpart and dull his perceptions of what is going on around him; therefore, advisor training should include the development of language skills and a comfort with the culture in which the advisor will be working. Where advisors’ language skills remain lacking, highly proficient, vetted, native interpreters are extremely important.
2. Advisors should push for accountability from their counterparts, a difficult task in many cultural contexts. The *mañana* (tomorrow), *insha'allah* (if God wills it), or *lat nua* (by and by) attitude can be deeply embedded in a culture and is more complex than simple laziness or irresponsibility. Repeated confrontation may not be useful, but reporting local incompetence or corruption to higher headquarters should be rigorous.
3. Advisors have a role in intelligence gathering. The information they have may sometimes be collected by objective, short-answer questionnaires designed for data quantification and analysis, but those questionnaires can famously miss the “smell” of the place, the things that are going on but not being remarked upon. Avenues for reporting outside of designed questionnaires should always be open.
4. Advisors should remember that, at its root, the conflict belongs to their counterparts. It is theirs to win or lose and they who will live most closely to the consequences; thus,



the counterpart’s way of doing things, while it may sometimes be frustrating to an American, may also sometimes be best because it is the counterpart’s way, and his way may be more culturally appropriate and more effective in the long run. Working out the best “best” way is why advising requires a high polish on the art of diplomacy.

5. Advisors in the military arm of a counterinsurgency program must often work with civilian agencies. Their combined effort can be complex and have many moving, often competing parts; thus, a unified command is needed to maximize efficiency, and both military and civilian sides of the effort need training, perhaps together, on how best to achieve it.
- These five lessons are only a sampling from a much longer



This photograph shows a typical hamlet fort in the Mekong Delta, Hoa Binh District, Kien Phong Province, in 1969. (Terry Turner Files)



First Lieutenant Terry Turner, Team Leader, MAT IV-32, is shown holding an M79 grenade launcher. Turner stands before a PF Barracks being constructed in his team's base compound. (Terry Turner Files)

list. They are mentioned here because each one connects to the central truth that insurgencies are not, in the end, defeated on the battlefield; they are defeated in the village where the fight is for the loyalty of the people. In Vietnam, it was the MATs of the U.S. Army that went to the villages to help win that loyalty for an allied government. MATs performed their tasks under difficult and often dangerous circumstances, and they helped push back an insurgency that was ultimately replaced by resort to conventional war. In doing that job, MATs operated outside the Army's mainstream and were unknown to many. Nevertheless, given the present emphasis on counterinsurgency in national affairs and Army doctrine, it is well they be remembered, not only their presence, but their challenges, their successes, and their lessons learned. ☞

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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