Ha Thanh
under attack, August 1968
There seems to be a
bit of controversy as to what hit the
Teamhouse on 30th of August 1968,
a 75mm round from a RR versus a 122mm
mortar round
but thanks to Sgt Melvin Thornton we
can give a true account of what happen
that day,
see bottom of the page
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30 AUG 68
At 0730 Capt Jones, CWO Vick,
and Sgt Beck from the
Headquarters and Maintenance
Squadron 17 Command
responded to an urgent request
from Special Forces to render
safe and recover a 122mm rocket
which had impacted within the
Special Forces Camp at Ha Thanh,
located 25km west of Quang Ngai
in Southern I Corps. Capt Jones,
CWO Vick, and Sgt Beck arrived
at the Special Forces Camp via
chopper at 1035. They walked
uphill to S-3 Operations,
entered operations shack, and
were receiving verbal
instructions on the location of
the dud round, when at 1040 an
incoming 122mm made a direct hit
on the shack resulting in six
KIA, five US, one Vietnamese and
five WIA from this single round.
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·
H&MS-17,
MWSG-17:
o
 Capt
James W. Jones,
Hawthorne
,
CA
o
CWO3
William L. Vick,
Paducah
,
KY
o
Sgt
John R. Beck,
Goshen
,
NY
·
DET
A-104 (HA THANH):
o
MSG
Tadeusz Sosniak, Burlington, ON,
B Co, 5th SF Group
o
PFC
Richard E. Traster, McMinnville,
OR, C Co, 5th SF Group
·
Civilian
Interpret
"Above
information thanks to the
Virtual Wall" |
|
Subject:
SF Losses in SEA for the week of
24 - 30 August
Sorted by Month, then by
Day, then by Year
There were no losses reported on
29 August.
Note that there was one
additional death as a result of
the 23 Aug attack on FOB4.
1LT John E. Miller died of
wounds on the 24th bringing the
total from attack to 17.
The complete listing is at:
http://www.sfahq.com/reg
1968
08 24 O-2 1LT John E. Miller
9305 KIA, DOW SVN; CCN, FOB4,
Quang Ngai Prov., Attack on FOB4
(wounded the night before and
DOW)
1968
08 30 E-8 MSG Tadeusz Sosniak
11F5S KIA SVN; A-104, Ha Thanh,
Quang Ngai Prov., 75mm RR from
Hill 223 hit the Teamhouse
1968
08 30 E-3 PFC Richard E. Traster
05B2S KIA SVN; A-104, Ha Thanh,
Quang Ngai Prov., 75mm RR from
Hill 223 hit the Teamhouse.
SF
losses in SEA for the week of 31
August - 06 September
1968
09 2 O-2 1LT James D. Peoples
31542 KIA SVN; A-102, Tien Phuoc,
at A-104, Ha Thanh, Quang Ngai
Prov.
From:
Reg Manning |
According to official records, they
appear to be two version on what hit the
Teamhouse that day!
Fortunately
, we have four team members who I believe
were present during that attack:
XO
-1st Lt Robert P Gilmartin
Demo
Sp4 Robert J Stepanian -
Medic SGT
Stafford
J Landry Jr
Commo
SGT Ivan D Davis
Medic
SGT Melvin Thornton
No
doubt the camp was being hit by 122mm
that day, but would they be able to
confirm
what type of round did hit the Teamhouse
that morning.
(I will upload new information as
soon as received)
Now,
what follows are some e-mails already
received regarding this event.
Photo
taken the
30th of August 68
The
last photo is
showing smoke from
an air strike on the
presumed firing
place of the round
that hit the team
house. At that time
it was thought that
a 122 rocket was
fired at the team
house.
All the photos were
taken from the
machinegun bunker
just inside the gate
as you enter the
camp.
Lt Honold and a
couple of other Sgts
were assigned to us
for the operation at
Ha Thanh.
The Mike Force was
always under
strength and we had
to borrow men from
the C Team from time
to time. Our
objective was to
recon the area south
of hill 113. The
camp thought they
were receiving 122
rounds from that
location. That's
where we first made
contact with the NVA.
15th
Co Mike Force
stayed to the end of
the trouble. It
wound-up being just Lt
Steve Ford and myself
with the Company.
We did a few patrols
and several ambushes.
On one of the
ambushes, the camp
supplied me with a
starlite scope and
several LAWs. I'm sure
glad the tanks never
showed up. I remember
the trouble that Lang
Vei had with the LAWs
and I wasn't warm and cozy
about using them
against Tanks.
I do
remember that a
Company of Cambodians
from the Na Trang Mike
Force showed up for
the party and I took
one of their platoons
out to set up an
ambush one night.
Info and photos
thanks Sgt Jack Deleshaw,
1st Plt Ldr, the
15th Co Mike Force (
Feb 68 - Jan 69)
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I
was in camp 25 days after the
attack on the teamhouse.
Phil Lugo was CO, and I was
briefed by Dean Kirkpatrick the
outgoing XO/CO.
The teamhouse was not used
much in September since we were
mortared every day at lunch,
(they liked to practice - and we
had flak jacket time).
The team house had shrapnel
damage and again, I was told and
could see where the concrete was
blown away on the third window
sill where the round impacted.
There were no holes in the
ceiling, or the floor, so
I can assure you folks that the
damage was done with a direct
fire weapon. When I asked
about who was killed in the
teamhouse I never heard about
the marines.
If I were in charge and had a
122 round in a hot camp, I would
have blown the sob in place,
we were not in prime real
estate. Could the marines
have been involved in some
district headquarters activity
on that same date????
1st Lt Robert P Gilmartin,
Ha Thanh, 9/68 - 04/69
|
I think we have
the on site observation of
fuza104 and it pretty clearly
IDs a direct fire weapon.
Fuza104 did you receive any
information on WIAs? US or
Indigenous? If they were US then
over half the team was either
killed or wounded.
As to the dud round, it would
probably depend on where it was.
If next to an ammo bunker or
something similar I just might
defer to EOD.
I cut and pasted the entry from
the Marine record as shown in
the prior emails. It seemed to
be very specific as to activity
and timeline. Given a Capt. and
a CWO were killed and they were
not an infantry unit per se, I
am inclined to think that they
were careful and accurate in
their written report (that is
just my feeling and could be
wrong).
SSG Michael J Fairlie,
Ha Thanh 9/69-9/70
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The
latest news are from one of
A-104 radio operator SGT Ivan
Davis
I was the radio operator during that
time. It was hectic and crazy
for about a month as we were under
constant attack and fear of about to
get overrun.
Woke up one morning, the team gathered
up outside and we were looking at the
OP3 which was southwest of the camp.
The NVA had overrun it the night
before and were setting up mortars to
hit the camp. I called C team to
inform them of the situation. I
notified the Air Force to do whatever
to the OP, as it was not in our hands.
Not very long, jets were pounding the stuffing
out of the hill. No
sooner than the jets would leave, the
NVA was back out hitting the camp with
the mortars. The little buggers
had really dug in.
We had Sean Flynn, a newspaper
correspondent, staying with us for a
while trying to get a story. He
got more than what he was looking for.
Later on, it was reported that he was
MIA in Cambodia or Laos.
Never did hear the final outcome of
his whereabouts.
At one time, I called in Naval
bombardment from the battleship New
Jersey which was sitting off shore of
Quang Ngai. They were hesitant
to fire the coordinates given to them
as it was on the west side of the camp
and the Navy was afraid a round might
hit the camp. I instructed them
to fire as we may not be here much
longer. Man, when one of those
shells cross over, what an Erie sound.
The ground shook just like an Arc
Light strike.
We were re-enforced by the Mike Force
along with Lt. Peoples, who was from
A-102, While he was on patrol
,he took a direct hit by an RPG.
We recovered his body and had him
transported to C team.
During this time frame, we had an
explosive team at camp. There
were 3-4 individuals on site
discussing some major items concerning
NVA ordinance. I had just left
the team house heading back for the
commo bunker when the 122MM hit the
team house. I jumped in the
mortar pit and we took a direct round.
After I woke up, I ran to the commo
bunker to let C team know we were
under serious assault. It was
then, Sgt. Dumas, medic, informed me
of the casualties. I notified C
team on the status of the team.
Killed in that action was MSGT.
Sosniak, Spec 4 Richard Traster, radio
operator, and the 3-4 weapons team.
Spec 4 Traster was going to be my
replacement when I was being
transferred back to C team and
eventually the Mike Force in Da Nang.
After the action slowed down, I
received a call from the FAC flying
overhead that he had a sorty flying
around and wanted to know where we
would like to have them drop their
ordinance. I informed him to hit
the valley following the river between
OP2 and OP3, which was on the west
side of the camp. We did not
have any friendly people in the area. A
few of the team went outside to
watch the planes fly over and drop
the bombs. It was a great sight
to see. Later, during the after
action report, we discovered the NVA
were bringing in tanks on that route.
Just by chance, we were able to
knock them out.
I believe the assault on A-104 went on
for close to 30 days. We took a
lot of casualties, killed or wounded.
Shortly after I redeployed to C team,
another radio operator at A-104, who
was on site a very short time, was
killed while on a mission.
Sgt Ivan Davis, Ha Thanh
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The
OP was overrun in August.
At that point it was used as a
night location for operations vs
being a permanently staffed OP.
I believe that had a small
contingency of Yards and one
VNSF on the OP that night.
There were either three or four
KIA and the remainder of those
that were there gradually
trickled back to camp the next
day.
Additional
information from Bob Stepanian
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Somewhere near the 24th of
August it was decided that a Mobile
Strike Force Company would be sent to
help the Team at A-104.
We spent the next night on the
perimeter in Camp, and while we were
ducking incoming the OP on a hilltop
northwest of the Camp radioed in that
they were under ground attack. Even
with TAC Air support they were overrun
and chased off the hill. The next
morning we mounted an operation to
retake the OP. With the tactical
situation as it was we could not let
them hang onto that OP looking
directly down on the Camp.
We started for the base of the hill
the OP was located on with 2nd
Platoon in the lead. I was always at,
or near the front of the formation, so
being point man of the point platoon
moving to contact didn’t seem that
strange to me. As I was sneaking along
a trail in the dense cover right at
the base of the hill I felt what
seemed like a light nudge on the front
of my right shoulder, and heard a shot
from less than 15 yards away. I tried
to aim my M-16 to return fire, but it
wouldn’t work quite right. I looked
down at my shoulder, and there was a
hole through the strap of my
indigenous ruck that was weeping a
little bit of blood. I thought, hmmm
you dumb shit, you just got shot. I
dropped and rolled off the trail. A
little firefight broke out, but after
I saw that the platoon had deployed
correctly I worked my way back to
where the U.S. LT and SGT were located
in what was laughingly termed the
Company Headquarters. I dropped the
ruck, and they took a look at the
front and back of the wound (good
thing I didn‘t get a look at the
back), slapped on a couple of field
dressings, and we called in a med-evac.
The Ha Thanh AO was hot, and at some
point a Stars and Stripes
Correspondent decided to come out to
the Camp. That day he attached himself
to us. I couldn’t get over how
little impact I felt, and it still
didn’t hurt very badly if I didn’t
move it, so when the Stars and Stripes
guy was hovering like a mother hen,
and kept wanting to give me morphine
injections I got a little hostile and
told him exactly what I was going to
do, and where I was going to put that
morphine syrette if he didn’t get
out of my face. He finally got the
hint. The med-evac chopper showed up,
and that was the end of the fighting
for me.
* In addition to the Mobile Strike
Force Company sent to Ha Thanh,
several days later a company of CIDG
with a U.S. lieutenant and sergeant
from Minh Long (I believe) was sent
out to reinforce A-104 also. The day
after I was wounded, in another
attempt to retake the OP by the
company from Minh Long, the LT was
killed, and the SGT wounded (I bumped
into the SGT in the hospital in Japan)
at the same spot on the ground where I
was shot.
I learned that Team Sergeant Sosniak
was killed about an hour after I was
med-evaced when the NVA dumped a 122mm
rocket into the Teamhouse.
After my second tour to Vietnam ending
in early 1973 (with the 1st Air
Cavalry near Bien Hoa, and SRAC in
Pleiku) I requested reassignment to 5th
Group, which by this time had rotated
back to Fort Bragg. While there I ran
into SFC Zickefoose, the Intel NCO at
A-104. “Zick” told me that after I
was evacuated every American at the
Camp ended up being killed or wounded.
I never confirmed that. I only know of
the LT from Minh Long, MSG Sosniak,
and a Team member I didn’t know
listed as KIA in early September. I
did notice that a number finished out
their tours, so if wounded it must
have been lightly.
I did hear that the Air Force knocked
out 6 tanks that had by-passed A-104,
and were east of the Camp when
destroyed.
1st
Lt, Gary J. Honold, also visit Ha Thanh
tales for more on Gary's experience in
Ha Thanh
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DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
1st
MOBILE
STRIKE FORCE
COMMAND, COMPANY “C”
5TH
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE),
1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO
US
FORCES 96337
CAMP Da Nang East
4 September 1968
SUBJECT:
Monthly Operational Summary for
1–31 August 68
THRU: Commanding Officer
Company C, 5th SFGA, 1st SF
APO
96337
TO:
Commanding Officer
5th SFGA, 1st SF
ATTN: AVGB-C
APO
US
FORCES 96240
At A-104 Ha Thanh, 15th MSF Co
has
been
in constant patrolling activity
from 25 August to date and has
confirmed 21 NVA/VC KIA.
Of
particular note was a night
ambush at 10 meters, which
resulted in 15 NVA KIA weapons
and
webbed gear were captured with
numerous satchel charges which
were carried by “sappers”
to
be used against the camp that
night. Negative friendly
casualties were taken.
s/Gonzalo
Quesada, Jr.
QUESADA,
GONZALO, JR
CAPT, Infantry
S-3
This is
an extract from the After Action
Report from the I CTZ Mike Force
CD available from Radix Press,
see link below. |
|
10 March
2009
When I was first
notified that something had
hit the team house, my first
reaction was a sapper and a satchel
charge planted by the window.
We always had the
"little" people
standing by the windows
looking in. Later I was
informed it was either an 75MM
or 122MM which had been
targeting the camp. This
is what I reported to C team.
Ivan Davis
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 from Sgt M Thornton
should put
an end to the
75mm recoilless versus the 122mm
mortar attack theory.
Sgt Melvin Thornton took a
patrol the following day to
locate the firing sites
and got a visual on what hit the
Teamhouse.
Follow is relevant part of
his e-mail received on the
09/06/09
I would like to add a
little to what you already know
about what happened to PFC
Trastner and MSG Sosniak. While
serving as the teams Sr.
medic at Ha Thanh from Sept
67 toSept 68, I was in a
trench line near my bunker when
the 122mm rocket hit the
teamhouse. I grabbed my aid bag
and ran for the teamhouse, as I
entered I immediately came
across PFC Traster who was
still alive, but had received a
massive head wound to the back
of his head. I bandaged his
head , then left him there
(still alive). I then responded
to other team members yelling
for help, they had removed MSG
Sosniak, Capt. Gesreagan and
another man (who I thought was
a Sea-bee) from the teamhouse.
Capt. Gesreagan had a very
serious shrapnel wound to
the knee. MSG Sosniak
had 10 to 15 serious shrapnel
wounds to the chest and
abdomen. He was still alive with
a faint a heartbeat, but
had problem breathing due to his
wounds. I continued with
his resuscitation for about 30
min. until the med-evac
chopper arrived, he
was still alive when put aboard,
as was PFC Traster.
I
have little knowledge of the
other casualties, as MSG Sosniak
had my full attention before
the evacuation.
It
might be of some interest to
some readers that the reason so
many people were in the team
house at the time was the
result of a caribou pilot having
scrounged up a pallet of ice
cold milk and was dropping a few
cases at each A-site in I corps.
MSG Sosniak had just returned
from the airstrip with them.
I
can clear up some of the
questions raised about the
missiles and their locations.
The missile in the wire was
about 20 to 30 feet from the
inter perimeter wire. It was
lined between the teamhouse and
the latrine. One had a perfect
view of it, right in front
of them, if one was dumb enough
to use the piss tube.
As for the
doubts about what it was that
hit the teamhouse, the next
morning I took a small patrol
out the front gate and toward
the general direction we though
the missiles were coming from. Less
than one click from the
camp, tucked in behind the
edge the little village of GO VI
(1) and between the base of OP 3 and
the river, we found 3 missile
launching sites. these sites
consisted of a long trench with
a bream at one end and a long
split tube of bamboo which
had been hollowed and smoothed
out, running along the top of
the bream. You could
visually get down and see that
were aligned with the LLDB
and the US teamhouse. I
took some photos and then destroyed
the launchers with hand
grenades. We immediately
returned to camp and I discussed
the matter with the temporary CO
Lt. Kilpatrick , who was new to
the camp, and only became the CO
after LT. Eagle had been
relieved of command . At my
urging he called for air strikes
on the missile launch site and on
one end of village of
GO VI (we gave our strikers 30
min. to get their families out
of the village). I have no doubt
that they were 122mm tubes and 2
had been used, and to this day I
believe everyone in the village had
to know they were there.
At this
time the command of the camp was
in complete disarray.
Melvin Thornton
Area
map
showing
Go
Vi
(1)
and
(2)
and
some
of
Ha
Thanh
OP's,
click
on
it
to
see
larger
version
Short
film
thanks
to
Wally174th
AHC
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