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The Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) early in the war had very little assets to
assign as field army advisors in South Vietnam and these Mobile Advisor Teams (MAT) were raised from available officer and NCO in Vietnam. After the start of the Vietnamisation doctrine
in 1968, Teams were specifically created to advise the Vietnamese Regional and
Popular forces (RF/PF). By 1969 all MAT
Teams were assigned to Vietnam directly from the United States for one-year tour of duty. The MATs were an essential part of the new
Vietnamisation doctrine to upgrade and modernize the Vietnamese Army. They
assisted the South Vietnamese military in combat planning, operations,
training, intelligence, psychological warfare, communications, civil affairs, logistics
and medical areas, but often suffered from political adversity and lack of all
official command authority. The MAT
Team advisors as well as furnishing leadership insured liaison with needed U.S fire support and airpower and often rallied
their South Vietnamese units, saving them from destruction on the battlefield.”
Organization and
hierarchy:
South
Vietnam was divided in provinces which had a Province Headquarters with a
Province Senior Advisor (PSA).
The PSA, a Colonel, was responsible for the advisory
districts within the province. Each advisory district had a District
Headquarters with a District Senior Advisor (DSA). The DSA, a Major, was
responsible for the MATs within the district. MATs ideally consisted
of one Captain team leader, one 1st Lieutenant assistant team
leader, one Sergeant First Class (SFC)
heavy weapons specialist, one SFC
light weapons specialist, and one SFC
senior medic, so a total of five men, but
from 1970 onwards it was not unusual to find team of three due to cut back
in the advisor deployments . Each MATs lived at a “home outpost” with the
South Vietnamese soldiers it was advising, and it usually operated by
itself, not with other MATs.
Regional Force and Popular Force: These MAT team advised RF/PF
units which were of lesser quality
readiness, equipment and training than the regular South Vietnamese units. They
normally were under the operational control of the South Vietnamese District
Chiefs within a given province, confining their operations to local security
missions within their assigned districts. Regional Force (RF’s) units were
normally organized into company sizes units and the Popular Force (PF’s)
consisted of platoon size units
Mobile Advisory Team I-27 by Cpt R Hensler (co), Duc Pho
District, Quang Ngai Province, 1970/71
I was assigned as the team lead for MAT I-27 in March 70,
operating out of Duc Pho, one of about four MAT teams subordinate to the
MACV Mo Duc U.S. Advisor Team 17 and responsible for Quang Ngai Province. From Mar-August of ’70,
I was at the hamlet of Dien Truong outpost next to the National Highway (QL1) on
the Coast side. Three RF companies and a “Group HQs” operated out of this
outpost. Most of our action occurred in very southern corner of the district
and province just north of Tam Quan that was across the Corps border in Binh
Dinh Prov. The area just south of our outpost contained numerous salt flats and
was a major area of interest for the VC. By this time 90 percent of the VC
units that we faced were manned by North Vietnamese personnel. The TET
Offensive of ’68 had been a disaster for the VC nearly wiping them out.
In August ’70 our team I-27, down to just two new NCOs and myself, was
moved up to Quang Ngai City and absorbed the remaining members of MAT I-4 to work with a newly
created Regional Forces battalion 103rd RF. It was during this
period of my tour that we operated over much of the province except for the
extreme western portions of Quang Ngai. When our unit, the 103rd RF
battalion, was not in the field, my boss would send us out with other
Vietnamese units, normally small specialized recon elements like the Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) that operated on very specific high priority
missions. This pattern continued till I rotated home in March of ‘71.
Believe that the picture
was taken not too long after a severe typhoon ravaged the area in Nov 70.
Standing L to R; SFC
Richard Edgar, SFC James Hollis, SSG Cu'u(wearing his grenadier vest),
myself and SGT Fitzgibbons and kneeling in front, SGT
Diep.
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Bob Hensler own
103RD RF patch
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My MAT Team looked pretty much
like regular troops when we were on operations. We mainly wore the OD
jungle fatigues with the MAC-V patch and usual US insignia as well as the 103RD
Regional Forces patch on our breast as a sign of respect for our counterpart.
It was also for them a status symbol to have US soldiers wearing the same
patch.
While on operation with the PRU we wore the US standard issue cammies (ERDL) jungle
uniform, my cammie jacket had name and US army tapes and a shoulder Ranger
tab. We always wore the flop jungle hat
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We had the Standard US Load Bearing equipment
with two to three ammo pouches and one or 2 water canteens on our belt. I also
carried a colt 45 in the standard belt black holster and a Korean War K bar
knife given to me by my uncle. Our rucksacks were the standard issue
lightweight frame type, with the ruck attached to the top and equipment
strapped under. I usually had another two canteen attached to my ruck. Our team
weapons were the standard issue M16, but we also had one CAR-15 in our team and one M79 grenade
launcher(carried by my interpreter SSG Cu’u) and an M60 (probably scrounged)
this was not taken on mission as our Vietnamese troops had plenty). Sometime we
carried our own PC25 Radio or it was carried by a RF trooper.
What we took on operation varied according to length of it, but I always carried
in the top of my ruck two M16 bandoleers
giving me an extra 16 mags. On some of
the shorter raids with the Pru , I only took my LBE with an extra ammo
bandoleer strapped over my chest.
Mission with the PRU
The PRU were the
executing arm of the Phoenix program, the eradication effort against
the VC political infrastructure. The mission I described bellow, although executed
with a PRU team, was not a specific Phoenix program. Most PRU teams had U.S. officers and sometimes additional NCOs
permanently assigned to work with them but for some reason the PRU team in Quang Ngai City had neither. I was periodically tasked
to accompany them. The missions with the PRU were completely separate and not
associated with the 103 RF Bn. I was sent along not because I had any special
expertise or experience, but because it was critical to have someone who could
speak fluent U.S. sounding English on a radio in case we needed fire support,
medevac or for terminal guidance of helicopters at mission beginning and
completion. If we were operating in the specific AO of a U.S. Bn, I would do
the up front coordination with the U.S. Bn TOC. Missions were always short, no
more than a few days max. Most were raids that were over within 10-12 hours.
The missions were very specific, focused on real time intelligence, and
normally resulted in enemy contact. I would ask for a volunteer to go with me. SFC Jim Hollis volunteered and accompanied
me on every one of them
Feb/March 1971
My last mission
in country sent me a good ways SW of the mountain camp at Ha Thanh with the
PRUs. It was late Feb or early Mar '71, and I only had a few weeks left in
country. We were clearly in “Injun” country on that mission. Butt was puckered
so tight it is a wonder I could even walk!
This mission targeted a potential
detention camp where there were purported to be some local SVN village official
who had been kidnapped. We were also trying to locate the center of mass of a
"production area," trails, caches, etc indicating a trans-load area
between two major river corridors, the Dak Drinh and Song Re. That mission
consisted of about 30 PRU, two NVA Chieu Hoi's and myself and Jim Hollis. SSG
Cu'u went on all but the last mission - he went AWOL from the team in Feb '71
and headed home to Saigon. He left a note apologizing. He had been
with one U.S. unit or another since the TET offensive
in 1968. (I loved that guy to death, what a courageous and tough soldier. Wish
I knew what happened to him. He had previously been awarded two U.S. Bronze
Star medals for gallantry in action.)
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Photo
of Cpt Bob Hensler (left)
with the MAT team leader from Ha Thanh, Jim Meyer
(right). I Believe he may have gotten stranded at our team house in QN City
during the noted Typhoon Nov 70 typhoon. Our team house was a way station for
anyone coming and going on R&R and rotating in or out. We had extra
bunks. Trouble was we were not there very often. The VN Prov chief kept us in
the field. I look so jovial because I'm standing in water almost up to
my crotch. It was the morning after the storm finally passed to the west.
Text and photos thanks to Cpt
R
Hensler MAT I-27 1970/71
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