MAT I-27,
Duc Phoc District,
QuangNgai province I
Corps
,
Republic of Vietnam
1970
I
arrived in Quang Ngai in March 1970. I was a 1st
Lt. with several months to go before making captain. I was
assigned to Duc Pho District (southernmost of the ten
districts in the province).
Calendar year ’70 was a bit over one year into President
Nixon’s “Vietnamization” program of ultimately turning
over the war to the South Vietnamese. In hindsight the
realization had settled in that America could not win the war
as it was currently being executed; the artificial
restrictions of not going after the sanctuaries in Cambodia
and Laos on a permanent basis, other than bombing the Ho Chi
Minh Trail and the brief incursions into Cambodia and Laos in
’70 and ’71 and more significant – not prosecuting a
total war against the North (like destroying the Red River
Dikes, making the population of the North suffer, etc).
Politically
it ended up being a way to extract ourselves from what had
become a terrible mess…Ultimately the South Vietnamese would
need to step up and fight to keep their freedom with the same
intensity as the North who wanted to reunite the country under
a Communist regime…
As
part of this overall Vietnamization program a larger emphasis
had been placed on improving the fighting ability of the
South’s forces. This translated into providing them with
better equipment and attempting to improve their overall
combat readiness.
Enter
my role in the greater scheme of things. The advisory effort,
U.S. NCOs and officers working with the South Vietnamese
forces, increased significantly in the late 1960s. One of
these programs included placing advisers with the Regional
Force and Popular Force units. These were units of lesser
quality readiness, equipment and training than the regular
South Vietnamese units. They normally were under the
operational control of the South Vietnamese District Chiefs
within a given province, confining their operations to local
security missions within their assigned districts. Regional
Force (RF’s) units were normally organized into company size
units and the Popular Force (PF’s) consisted of platoon size
units. The U.S. created Mobile Advisory Teams, “MAT
Teams” to specifically work with these RF/PF units. The
concept was for these five man teams, consisting of a Captain,
Lt. and three NCOs to move from one unit to another, normally
within an assigned District, training and operating with these
units. Hence the term “Mobile Advisory Team.”
MAT
I-27
When
I got to Quang Ngai in March ’70 I was assigned as the team lead for MAT I-27, operating out of Duc Pho the southernmost district, one of about four MAT teams
subordinate to the MACV Mo Duc U.S. Advisor Team 17 and responsible for Quang
Ngai Province. There was also a district advisory team in each
of the ten districts in the province. If you go to the map and
scroll down past the district capitol of Duc Pho look for a
strip of land between two lakes right on the Coast. Find the
hamlet of Dien Truong, and that’s where I was from
Mar-August of ’70. Our outpost was right next to the
highway, National Highway (QL) 1 on the Coast side. Three RF
companies and a “Group HQs” operated out of this outpost.
Most of our action occurred in very southern corner of the
district and province just north of Tam Quan that was across
the Corps border in Binh Dinh Prov. The area just south of our
outpost contained numerous salt flats and was a major area of
interest for the VC. By this time 90 percent of the VC units
that we faced were manned by North Vietnamese personnel. The
TET Offensive of ’68 had been a disaster for the VC nearly
wiping them out.
In
August ’70 our team, down to just two new NCOs, and myself,
was moved up to the Prov. Capitol, Quang Ngai City and
combined with MAT I-4. A RF battalion, similar in organization
to a regular SVN battalion, was activated in Quang Ngai and
the MAT teams were the units designated to work with them. It
was during this period of my tour that we operated over much
of the province save for the extreme western portions of Quang
Ngai.
When
our unit, the 103rd RF battalion, was not in the
field, my boss would send us out with other Vietnamese units,
normally small specialized recon elements like the Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) that operated on very specific
high priority missions. This pattern continued till I rotated
home in March of ‘71
Believe that the picture was
taken not too long after a severe
typhoon ravaged the area in Nov 70. Standing
L to R; SFC
Richard Edgar, SFC James Hollis, SSG Cu'u(wearing his grenadier vest),
myself and SGT Fitzgibbons and kneeling in front, SGT
Diep.
During
my tour two of our camps were overrun and advisers killed. In
Aug or early Sept. ’70 the mountain camp at Tra Bong
(northernmost mountain district) was hit, and in Jan or Feb of
’71 the MAT team at Mo Duc,
district just north of Duc Pho,
was overrun. Both times our RF battalion reacted and spent
time beating the bush
so to speak to no avail.
During
my tour there were five U.S. Infantry battalions operating in
Quang Ngai, all part of the 23rd (Americal)
Division.
The Americal Division’s main base camp was just
north across the Quang Ngai border into Quang Tim Province
at
Chu Lai on the Coast.
The
largest U.S. base in Quang Ngai was “LZ Bronco” in Duc Pho.
It was the headquarters of the 11th Infantry
Brigade of the Americal Div. The name Bronco actually
originated from when the Third Brigade, 25th
Infantry Div occupied it several years before. Before that the
Marines called it something else.
Quang
Ngai City was also the headquarters for the U.S. Second ARVN
Infantry Div. Advisory Team.
I
specifically remember when the U.S. advisers went back into
Gia-Vuc when it was redesignated a Biet Dung Quan (Ranger)
unit, I believe in the fall of ’70.
Quang
Ngai was the only province in I Corps that did not border on
Laos. Its western border was with Kontum Province. Between the
SF and/or LLDB/BDQ camps in Kontum and those in Quang Ngai
there existed a void of approximately 50-60 KMs of some of the
most difficult terrain in all of SVN. This would have been the
area north and west of Gia-Vuc. In those days directly west
across the Song Re from Gia-Vuc was actually part of Kontum
Province. I have seen maps of present day VN and the borders
now are significantly different.
Interestingly
enough this area west of the Quang Ngai district camps at Ha
Thanh and Tra Bong, the two northernmost mountain camps, were
so remote that NO large-scale (battalion sized) U.S.
operations ever occurred there ( to their west). It took over
an hour by helicopter to get 6-10 KMs west of these two camps.
Some small specialized operations occurred in this void but
very few. The U.S. First Cavalry Div. did conduct some large
operations along the Song Re in 1967 or early ‘68, but after
that I am not aware of any large missions. The area was simply
too remote. Not surprisingly, it was a major infiltration
route from Western Kontum and Laos into the Coastal Lowlands
to the southeast in Binh Dinh Province.
It
was in this area about 20-30 KMs west of the camp at Tra Bong
where the Communists had their MR 5 Regional POW camp. MR 5
was the Communist geographical designation for the region that
now comprises the central part of Vietnam. This camp suffered
nearly a 40 percent mortality rate between 1965 and 1971 when
the POWs were moved west to the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
ultimately to North Vietnam.
"There
are two excellent books on the ordeal suffered by the men in
this camp; one is The Survivors, by Zalin Grant. It is out of
print and I found it by going to a generic used book web site.
The other book is Why didn’t you get me out by Frank Anton,
a helicopter pilot held captive for five years. Grant’s book
erroneously depicts this camp complex in Quang Tin Prov. but
it was in Quang Ngai. (I looked up Anton’s book at
www.Amazon.com )
While on active duty I was able to follow the efforts of the
U.S. Joint Task Force Full Accounting and their efforts to
recover some of those who died while in this camp and were
buried in its several locations. One of JTFA’s missions is
to recover U.S. personnel remains missing in action in Indo
China.
Ultimately
all the mountain camps in Quang Ngai were overrun. It was
always my impression that the Communists were deliberately
laying low so to speak in 1970 and part of ’71 to further
the myth that Nixon’s Vietnamization program was working. My
former boss who was present in Quang Ngai until mid ’72 told
me that by the time he rotated out, all of the mountain camps
had been seized and that the South Vietnamese only controlled
isolated enclaves around some of the district capitols – a
sad end to the efforts by all of those who soldiered in Quang
Ngai.
Bob Hensler own
103RD RF patch
My
MAT Team looked pretty much like regular
troops when we were on operations. We
mainly wore the OD jungle fatigues with
the MAC-V patch and usual US insignia as
well as the 103RD Regional
Forces patch on our breast as a sign of
respect for our counterpart. It was also
for them a status symbol to have US
soldiers wearing the same patch.
While on operation with the PRU we wore
the US standard issue cammies (ERDL)
jungle uniform, my cammie jacket had
name and US army tapes and a shoulder
Ranger tab. We always wore the flop
jungle hat.
We
had the Standard US Load Bearing equipment
with two to three ammo pouches and one or 2
water canteens on our belt. I also carried a
colt 45 in the standard belt black holster
and a Korean War K bar knife given to me by
my uncle. Our rucksacks were the standard
issue lightweight frame type, with the ruck
attached to the top and equipment strapped
under. I usually had another two canteen
attached to my ruck. Our team weapons were
the standard issue M16, but we also had one
CAR-15 in our team and one M79 grenade
launcher (carried by my interpreter SSG
Cu’u) and an M60 (probably scrounged) this
was not taken on mission as our Vietnamese
troops had plenty). Sometime we carried our
own PC25 Radio or it was carried by aRF trooper.
What we took on operation varied according
to length of it, but I always carried in the
top of my ruck two M16bandoleers giving me an extra 16 mags.
On
some of the shorter raids with the Pru , I
only took my LBE with an extra ammo
bandoleer strapped over my chest.
Mission
with the PRU
The
PRU were the executing arm of the Phoenix program, the
eradication effort against the VC political infrastructure. The
mission I described bellow, although executed with a PRU team, was not
a specific Phoenix program. Most PRU teams had U.S. officers and
sometimes additional NCOs permanently assigned to work with them
but for some reason the PRU team in Quang Ngai City had neither.
I was periodically tasked to accompany them. The missions with
the PRU were completely separate and not associated with the 103
RF Bn. I was sent along not because I had any special expertise
or experience, but because it was critical to have someone who
could speak fluent U.S. sounding English on a radio in case we
needed fire support, medevac or for terminal guidance of
helicopters at mission beginning and completion. If we were
operating in the specific AO of a U.S. Bn, I would do the up
front coordination with the U.S. Bn TOC. Missions were always
short, no more than a few days max. Most were raids that were
over within 10-12 hours. The missions were very specific,
focused on real time intelligence, and normally resulted in
enemy contact. I would ask for a volunteer to go with me. SFC
Jim Hollis volunteered and accompanied me on every one of them
Feb/March
1971
My
last mission in country sent me a good ways SW of the mountain
camp at Ha Thanh with the PRUs. It was late Feb or early Mar
'71, and I only had a few weeks left in country. We were clearly
in “Injun” country on that mission. Butt was puckered so
tight it is a wonder I could even walk!
This
mission targeted a potential detention camp where there were
purported to be some local SVN village official who had been
kidnapped. We were also trying to locate the center of mass of a
"production area," trails, caches, etc indicating a
trans-load area between two major river corridors, the Dak Drinh
and Song Re. That mission consisted of about 30 PRU, two NVA
Chieu Hoi's and myself and Jim Hollis. SSG Cu'u went on all but
the last mission - he went AWOL from the team in Feb '71 and
headed home to Saigon. He left a note apologizing. He had been
with one U.S. unit or another since the TET offensive in 1968.
(I loved that guy to death, what a courageous and tough soldier.
Wish I knew what happened to him. He had previously been awarded
two U.S. Bronze Star medals for gallantry in action.)
Photo
of Cpt Bob Hensler (left)
with the MAT team leader from Ha Thanh, Jim Meyer (right).
I Believe he may have gotten stranded at our team house in
QN City during the noted Typhoon Nov 70 typhoon. Our team
house was a way station for anyone coming and going on
R&R and rotating in or out. We had extra bunks.
Trouble was we were not there very often. The VN Prov
chief kept us in the field. I look so jovial because
I'm standing in water almost up to my crotch. It was the
morning after the storm finally passed to the west. Text
and photos thanks to Cpt R
Hensler MAT I-27 1970/71
Bob
Hensler, Cpt MAT 1-27, Duc
Pho District,
Quang Ngai Province, 1970